torstaina, maaliskuuta 24, 2011
Changing Baltic Sea military threats
Cold war era in the Baltic Sea was militarily quite predictable and considerably calm under the global reassurance-deterrence balance and military equilibrium of military forces. Occasionally global crises on each decennium between two big powers Nato and Warsaw Pact reflected tension to the Baltic Sea. Both allies were actively surveying and spying the territorial waters of Finland and Sweden sometimes up to the Gulf of Bothnia.
Unallied and wartime neutral Sweden had a strong naval defence with few hundreds warplanes and submarines surveying and reconnoitring territorial and international waters. Uniquely neutral Finland had a strategic coastal defence supported by a strong mining capacity and a quite comprehensive underwater surveillance system and a reasonable air interception capacity. Finland operated in the frame of the treaty on cooperation and friendship and mutual assistance with Soviet Union and managed to avoid political crises reaching military dimensions.
The military political centre of gravity in the Baltic Sea was in the Danish straits and the Sea constituted being a flank for the massive central European forces. Nato surveillance penetrated deeply to the Baltic Sea and Soviet navy was on call in the Danish straits. Usually during the crises the Soviet fleet was out on the high seas and regularly expansive navy exercises occupied the horizon keeping sea surveillance systems alerted. Danish Nato sea mining facilities were standing by constantly. The Baltic Sea was nearly Soviet inland sea. Despite the permanent confrontation the economical maritime traffic was very seldom disturbed.
After the Soviet Union collapsed Russian intensity decreased dramatically and fewer submarines, warships and warplanes were observed in the Baltic Sea. Nato and its Nordic allies were confused but still alerted. Nato lost her basic muse; eastern threat did not exist any longer. The organisation had to find a new concept and mission in order to convince her legitimate existence. Sweden ended to the conclusion that there will not be any military threat at least within a decade. Nordic political decision makers and leaders set a pressure to streamline armed forces. Finland followed the process a few steps behind.
While former Soviet armed forces were decaying and the navy intensity declined globally the Nordic countries commenced to streamlining their forces. Newly independent Baltic countries strived to build capabilities to control their territory. Finland, Sweden and Nato supported the Baltic countries’ efforts. Sweden felt relaxed and was at the head in cutting territorial forces. Swedish coastal defence was nearly disarmed, submarine programs cooled down and army and air force suffered heavy cuttings.
In the early 90’ies new crises like in Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia and Balkans kept politicians, researchers and think tanks busy in order to find an appropriate strategic concept. UN was toothless in Bosnia and Kosovo. Late 90’ies 1998 EU Summit in St. Malo adopted a new proposal of European crises management, which was further developed in EU Summits in Berlin and Helsinki. Later on United States bought the concept. On 2001 the 911 tragedies strengthened the new crises management concept and created the war on terrorism. Nordic Nato-members and Sweden accelerated to build crises management capabilities participating thus in global responsibilities and serving their foreign policy. Crises management was found as armed forces’ mission number one. Finnish defence forces’ first priorities was yet and stills a national territorial defence. Traditional UN-missions and developing PfP-cooperation within Nato were in agenda as well. In the larger European picture the Baltic Sea was not militarily very challenging. Danish straits cold war function was gone. The Baltic Sea military potential decreased permanently to the lower level, as it was believed.
In the beginning of the new millennium oil price was approximate 20 USD barrel starting to increase sharply being later 2008 150 USD barrel. In the course of increasing oil price Russia intensified oil export via the Baltic Sea. The waterway gained gradually more importance for Russian economy and consequently increased the need of navy presence. The Baltic Sea region’s maritime security officials were alerted and environmental authority and circles awaked to emphasise oil accident risks. The military monitored altering situation.
The Baltic Sea strategic assessments gained new dimension after Germany and Russia made 2007 an agreement on gas delivery through the pipelines on the seabed. Baltic countries and Poland reacted immediately. They stressed the environment risks but actually were more concerned of their transit trade and security. Sweden announced the project being a security political question too. Finland considered the project mainly being an environmental issue.
The Baltic Sea countries and EU realised that the sea itself and maritime sea traffic is vital for them all. The Baltic Sea strategy proposals popped up in EU parliament. The waterway has been most important for Finland and Russian economy but along with the pipeline project it is crucial for the German and EU energy policy and economy. Nato interest comes from the Baltic members’ and Poland’s demands and United States general interests to the Russian activities. For the Finnish economy it has mainly an environmental meaning but undoubtedly it is a burden that the pipeline puts on the use of economical maritime zone as well.
The pipeline construction works and security measures are obviously working well between the pipeline company, respective countries’ officials and various international subcontractors. All the coastal countries have their own measures to control the construction works on the respective territorial waters and economical zones. It needs to forward the surveillance activities to the international waters as well. National perspective usually goes before the common interest.
Along with the high oil prices Russia made a decision to modernize 45 percent of the defense forces weaponry by the 2015 although the process has slowed down with lower oil prices and economic downswing. The pipeline project has generated a new security discussion and security thinking in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia is heralding their main effort being the pipeline protection. Early this year media reported Russia bought a new landing operation support vessel from France and Sweden is searching partners for their new submarine project. Process has increased all parties’ presence in the Baltic Sea. Vladimir Putins 2007 speech in Munich, Georgian war 080808, Russian energy transit trade problems with Byelorussia, Baltic countries and Poland have all retarded confidence building process with Russia in the Baltic Sea. Latest German talks with France and Poland about a joint proposal for Russian-European ”cooperation on security” have raised EU and transatlantic dialogue. United States calls for the Nato being an essential part of the process. Certainly this will have reflects on the pipeline discussions and the Baltic Sea military situation.
Global security challenges and asymmetric threats have resulted a common information collecting and operational networking in the Baltic Sea. Unfortunately most European governments cut their defense budgets last year, which substantiated fears that the goals of the European Security and Defense policy (ESDP) will seriously weakened. This together with the inefficiencies in Afghanistan and Kosovo created by the impasse in relations between EU and Nato has raised demands of closer defense cooperation between EU and Nato.
Already for some time this initiative has been constituted in the Baltic Sea where Finland, Sweden and Nato and some international partners have had a good cooperation in exercises developing functional maritime situational awareness and surveillance systems. Closest cooperation is Finland and Sweden’s deepening sea-surveillance cooperation (SUCFIS) having the objective of exchange even classified data. The Baltic sea-surveillance cooperation (SUCBAS) offered to all Baltic Sea countries and Norway is aiming to exchange maritime information. It is meant to be a node for the European Defense Agency’s maritime surveillance system (MARSUR) that will enable the dialogue between 15 EU members and EU and Nato maritime actors. Evidently these strengthen situational awareness and security in the Baltic Sea but need Russia more closely to come along.
(Published in the bimonthly review Baltic Rim Economies, issue no 4, 31 August 2010 by the Turku School of Economics (TSE), Pan-European Institute)
Unallied and wartime neutral Sweden had a strong naval defence with few hundreds warplanes and submarines surveying and reconnoitring territorial and international waters. Uniquely neutral Finland had a strategic coastal defence supported by a strong mining capacity and a quite comprehensive underwater surveillance system and a reasonable air interception capacity. Finland operated in the frame of the treaty on cooperation and friendship and mutual assistance with Soviet Union and managed to avoid political crises reaching military dimensions.
The military political centre of gravity in the Baltic Sea was in the Danish straits and the Sea constituted being a flank for the massive central European forces. Nato surveillance penetrated deeply to the Baltic Sea and Soviet navy was on call in the Danish straits. Usually during the crises the Soviet fleet was out on the high seas and regularly expansive navy exercises occupied the horizon keeping sea surveillance systems alerted. Danish Nato sea mining facilities were standing by constantly. The Baltic Sea was nearly Soviet inland sea. Despite the permanent confrontation the economical maritime traffic was very seldom disturbed.
After the Soviet Union collapsed Russian intensity decreased dramatically and fewer submarines, warships and warplanes were observed in the Baltic Sea. Nato and its Nordic allies were confused but still alerted. Nato lost her basic muse; eastern threat did not exist any longer. The organisation had to find a new concept and mission in order to convince her legitimate existence. Sweden ended to the conclusion that there will not be any military threat at least within a decade. Nordic political decision makers and leaders set a pressure to streamline armed forces. Finland followed the process a few steps behind.
While former Soviet armed forces were decaying and the navy intensity declined globally the Nordic countries commenced to streamlining their forces. Newly independent Baltic countries strived to build capabilities to control their territory. Finland, Sweden and Nato supported the Baltic countries’ efforts. Sweden felt relaxed and was at the head in cutting territorial forces. Swedish coastal defence was nearly disarmed, submarine programs cooled down and army and air force suffered heavy cuttings.
In the early 90’ies new crises like in Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia and Balkans kept politicians, researchers and think tanks busy in order to find an appropriate strategic concept. UN was toothless in Bosnia and Kosovo. Late 90’ies 1998 EU Summit in St. Malo adopted a new proposal of European crises management, which was further developed in EU Summits in Berlin and Helsinki. Later on United States bought the concept. On 2001 the 911 tragedies strengthened the new crises management concept and created the war on terrorism. Nordic Nato-members and Sweden accelerated to build crises management capabilities participating thus in global responsibilities and serving their foreign policy. Crises management was found as armed forces’ mission number one. Finnish defence forces’ first priorities was yet and stills a national territorial defence. Traditional UN-missions and developing PfP-cooperation within Nato were in agenda as well. In the larger European picture the Baltic Sea was not militarily very challenging. Danish straits cold war function was gone. The Baltic Sea military potential decreased permanently to the lower level, as it was believed.
In the beginning of the new millennium oil price was approximate 20 USD barrel starting to increase sharply being later 2008 150 USD barrel. In the course of increasing oil price Russia intensified oil export via the Baltic Sea. The waterway gained gradually more importance for Russian economy and consequently increased the need of navy presence. The Baltic Sea region’s maritime security officials were alerted and environmental authority and circles awaked to emphasise oil accident risks. The military monitored altering situation.
The Baltic Sea strategic assessments gained new dimension after Germany and Russia made 2007 an agreement on gas delivery through the pipelines on the seabed. Baltic countries and Poland reacted immediately. They stressed the environment risks but actually were more concerned of their transit trade and security. Sweden announced the project being a security political question too. Finland considered the project mainly being an environmental issue.
The Baltic Sea countries and EU realised that the sea itself and maritime sea traffic is vital for them all. The Baltic Sea strategy proposals popped up in EU parliament. The waterway has been most important for Finland and Russian economy but along with the pipeline project it is crucial for the German and EU energy policy and economy. Nato interest comes from the Baltic members’ and Poland’s demands and United States general interests to the Russian activities. For the Finnish economy it has mainly an environmental meaning but undoubtedly it is a burden that the pipeline puts on the use of economical maritime zone as well.
The pipeline construction works and security measures are obviously working well between the pipeline company, respective countries’ officials and various international subcontractors. All the coastal countries have their own measures to control the construction works on the respective territorial waters and economical zones. It needs to forward the surveillance activities to the international waters as well. National perspective usually goes before the common interest.
Along with the high oil prices Russia made a decision to modernize 45 percent of the defense forces weaponry by the 2015 although the process has slowed down with lower oil prices and economic downswing. The pipeline project has generated a new security discussion and security thinking in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia is heralding their main effort being the pipeline protection. Early this year media reported Russia bought a new landing operation support vessel from France and Sweden is searching partners for their new submarine project. Process has increased all parties’ presence in the Baltic Sea. Vladimir Putins 2007 speech in Munich, Georgian war 080808, Russian energy transit trade problems with Byelorussia, Baltic countries and Poland have all retarded confidence building process with Russia in the Baltic Sea. Latest German talks with France and Poland about a joint proposal for Russian-European ”cooperation on security” have raised EU and transatlantic dialogue. United States calls for the Nato being an essential part of the process. Certainly this will have reflects on the pipeline discussions and the Baltic Sea military situation.
Global security challenges and asymmetric threats have resulted a common information collecting and operational networking in the Baltic Sea. Unfortunately most European governments cut their defense budgets last year, which substantiated fears that the goals of the European Security and Defense policy (ESDP) will seriously weakened. This together with the inefficiencies in Afghanistan and Kosovo created by the impasse in relations between EU and Nato has raised demands of closer defense cooperation between EU and Nato.
Already for some time this initiative has been constituted in the Baltic Sea where Finland, Sweden and Nato and some international partners have had a good cooperation in exercises developing functional maritime situational awareness and surveillance systems. Closest cooperation is Finland and Sweden’s deepening sea-surveillance cooperation (SUCFIS) having the objective of exchange even classified data. The Baltic sea-surveillance cooperation (SUCBAS) offered to all Baltic Sea countries and Norway is aiming to exchange maritime information. It is meant to be a node for the European Defense Agency’s maritime surveillance system (MARSUR) that will enable the dialogue between 15 EU members and EU and Nato maritime actors. Evidently these strengthen situational awareness and security in the Baltic Sea but need Russia more closely to come along.
(Published in the bimonthly review Baltic Rim Economies, issue no 4, 31 August 2010 by the Turku School of Economics (TSE), Pan-European Institute)
# posted by Seppo Ruohonen @ 11:24 ap. 
